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1 Introduction
Entry deterrence refers to any conduct whereby an established rm prevents
potential competitors from entering the market. Industrial organization text-
books provide stylized models showing how this conduct may pertain to
dimensions such as capacity building, advertising, R&D, and the array of
product varieties to o¤er. For example, a simple model of strategic product
proliferation is sketched out in Cabral (2000, pp. 265-267). The model con-
siders an industry whose output need not be homogeneous in that di¤erent
product varieties may di¤er in terms of a single characteristics. Production
of each variety exhibits economies of scale, due to a xed component in the
cost function. In the face of the varieties chosen by the established rm
(incumbent), a potential competitor chooses whether to enter the industry,
in which case he is assumed to o¤er just one variety. As in Schmalensees
seminal work (1978), the price is taken to be xed. A well dened range is
found for the xed cost which makes it most protable for the incumbent to
o¤er two varieties in order to deter entry whereas, absent the threat of entry,
he would o¤er just one variety.
One question I have often been asked when lecturing on this topic is how
the location choice made by the incumbent would change if the xed cost went
below the aforementioned range. Another issue is whether it would make a
di¤erence for the results if the entrant too were allowed to o¤er multiple
varieties.1 Addressing these two points is the aim of this pedagogical note.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Cabrals model. In
Section 3 we allow the entrant to o¤er multiple varieties and consider how
the equilibrium of the two-stage location game depends on the size of the
xed cost. Quite interestingly, the extent of strategic product proliferation
turns out to be the same as when the potential entrant may produce just one
variety. And, most importantly, the analysis will deliver the main message for
students of an industrial organization course: the density of the incumbents
varieties in the output space will tend to be the higher as the degree of scale
economies is the lower.
1According to Cabral, "the results are qualitatively similar if we consider multiple
varieties" (2000, p. 266) on the part of the entrant.
2 Cabrals model
In Cabrals model, the industry output, say, ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast
cereals,2 need not be homogeneous in that di¤erent product varieties may
di¤er in terms of a single characteristics, say, sweetness. The space of this
characteristics is the interval [0; 1]. A large number of consumers are uni-
formly distributed over this interval in terms of their preference: therefore,
the consumers whose most preferred grade of sweetness is less than x are a
fraction x of the total.
A two-stage location game of perfect information is analyzed. There are
two players, the "incumbent" and the "potential entrant" (hereinafter, rms
I and E, respectively). In the rst stage rm I chooses which varieties to
o¤er; in the knowledge of rm Is choice, in the second stage rm E chooses
whether to enter and with which varieties. The price is assumed to be xed
at p, independently of how many producers are active and the varieties on
o¤er. Demand by each consumer is positive, no matter how far his location
from the closest variety on o¤er; total industry demand is normalized to one.
The long-run production cost of any variety is assumed to be the constant
F , no matter the output level q of that variety. Thus there are economies of
scale, average cost being AC(q) = F=q for each variety.
It will be convenient to assume that, whenever there are two or more
most protable alternatives, the one entailing the largest output is chosen.
As an implication, if the maximum prot from being active is zero, the rm
chooses to be active rather than not.
If a pure monopolist, rm I would o¤er just one variety, thereby obtaining
prots of p  F , since additional varieties would only raise cost. We let
F  p (1)
in order for the industry to be viable for a a pure monopolist.
Further notation will be helpful. Prots are denoted by I and E for
rms I and E, respectively. Any variety i o¤ered by rm I is denoted by its
location lI;i 2 [0; 1]. Firm Is choice is a location vector, nI = (lI;1; :::; lI;nI ),
where nI is the number of varieties o¤ered. Without loss of generality, we
2According to Schmalensee (1978), strategic brand proliferation might explain the ab-
sence of substantial entry which characterized the industry of RTE breakfast cereals over
almost three decades since 1940, in spite of the rapid growth of demand, the high prof-
itability and the small degree of scale economies.
let lI;i+1 > lI;i (each i  1). We similarly denote Es location choice by
nE = (lE;1; :::; lE;nE), where lE;i 2 [0; 1] (each i = 1; :::; nE) and nE is the
number of varieties o¤ered. In the following, lE;j = l
 
I;i (lE;j = l
+
I;i) means
that variety lE;j is located to the left (to the right) and arbitrarily close to
variety lI;i.
In Cabrals model, rm E is allowed to produce a single variety. As for
rm I, the following two options are compared: to produce a single variety or
the pair of varieties (1
4
; 3
4
). This pair e¤ectively prevents entry if F > p
4
. In
fact, rm Es maximum output is then 1
4
, obtained by locating in the interval
[1
4
; 3
4
]. Thus, Es maximum prot if entering is p
4
  F , which is negative if
F > p
4
. Thus, holding this condition, E does not enter and I = p   2F ,
which is non-negative if F  p
2
. Alternatively, rm I might consider o¤ering
a single variety: then it would locate at lI;1 =
1
2
, which minimizes rm Es
maximum output if entering, equal to 1
2
and obtained by locating at lE;1 =
1
2
on the product line. This leads to I = E =
p
2
  F . If F  p
2
, this is
nonnegative and hence E enters the market; at the same time, I ends up
with prots lower than (or at least not higher) than p   2F , which is its
prots (holding F > p
4
) with the vector of locations (1
4
; 3
4
). To conclude, the
incumbent o¤ers a pair of varieties to prevent entry if
F 2

p
4
;
p
2

. (2)
More formally, holding (2), it is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium for
rm I to o¤er nI = (
1
4
; 3
4
), which prevents rm E from entering the market.
This illustrates strategic product proliferation: I would o¤er just one variety
(for example, variety 1
2
) if there were no threat of entry or F 2
 
p
2
; p

.
3 Allowing multiple varieties for the entrant
Here we extend Cabrals model by considering any value of F 2 (0; p) and,
most importantly, by allowing the production of multiple varieties by rm E.
This will further clarify the relationship between product proliferation and
the degree of scale economies.3
3Unlike our model, Bonanno (1987) and Neven et al. (1989) analyze entry deterrence
in a location model in which the price is endogenously determined; at the same time,
Further notation is needed: qE(nE j nI) and E(nE j nI) = pqE(nE j
nI) nEF denote, respectively, the maximum output and prot obtained by
E with nE varieties, conditional on nI; I(nI) denotes Is prot with nI.
As a preliminary step, it must be understood how the density of Is
varieties on the product line will a¤ect Es prot opportunities. To start
with, we dene n
I
-location vectors.4
Denition. For any number of varieties nI , let n

I
:= (lI;1; :::; l

I;nI
) be
the location vector such that:
lI;i+1   l

I;i = 2l

I;1; (i = 1; :::; nI   1) (3)
lI;nI = 1  l

I;1: (4)
In words: the interval between any two subsequent locations is twice as large
as the interval [0; lI;1] and the interval [l

I;nI
; 1]. Side summation over the
equations (3) yields lI;nI   l

I;1 = 2(nI   1)l

I;1; along with (4), this leads to
lI;1 = 1  l

I;nI
= 1
2nI
and lI;i+1   l

I;i =
1
nI
(each i = 1; :::; nI   1). Vectors of
locations n
I
are (1
4
; 3
4
), (1
6
; 1
2
; 5
6
), (1
8
; 3
8
; 5
8
; 7
8
), and so on and so forth.
It will be shown that
qE(nE j n

I
) =
nE
2nI
for nE = 1; :::; 2nI : (5)
For example, qE(nE = 1 j n

I
) = 1
2nI
, obtained with lE;1 2 [l

I;i; l

I;i+1] (1  i 
nI 1).
5 With nE = nI , Es output is maximal with nE = n

I
: if all of rm Is
varieties are matched, then one may take Es output to be 1
2
, which coheres
with (5). As nE increases above nI , Es output keeps on increasing at the
rate 1
2nI
, so long as nE < 2nI . In fact, with nE = nI+h (any h  nI), rm E
would closely "surround" h of Is varieties to maximize its sales. For example,
with nE = nI + 1, E might choose nE = (lE;1; lE;2; :::; lE;nE) = (l
 
I;1; l
+
I;1;
lI;2; :::; l

I;nI
): then lE;1 and lE;2 capture a market share of
1
2nI
each,6 and the
however, the potential entrant is allowed to produce just one variety.
4These location vectors are discussed by Neven (1985), Bonanno (1987) and Neven et
al. (1989) in a context where the price is endogenously determined.
5Or with lE;1 = l
 
I;1 or lE;1 = l
+
I;nI
.
6Variety lI;1 is completely displaced: consumers in the interval [0;
1
2nI
) will purchase
variety lE;1 and consumers in the interval (
1
2nI
; 2
2nI
) will purchase variety lE;2.
same holds for the remaining nE   2 = nI   1 varieties; therefore, qE(nE =
nI+1 j n

I
) = nI+1
2nI
= nE
2nI
. This reasoning extends to any nE = nI+1; :::; 2nI .
For instance, with nE = 2nI , E will choose nE = (l
 
I;1; l
+
I;1; :::; l
 
I;nI
; l+I;nI ),
thereby serving the whole market, again coherently with (5).
Consequently,
E(nE j n

I
) =
nE
2nI
p  nEF = nE

p
2nI
  F

for nE = 1; :::; 2nI . (6)
Thus E(nE j n

I
) is proportional to nE: as a consequence, if it does not
pay to enter with one variety, which leads to prots of p
2nI
  F , a fortiori it
does not pay to o¤er several varieties; if, instead, entering with one variety
is protable, then E will o¤er twice as many varieties as the incumbent.
Among the nI-location vectors corresponding to any number nI of vari-
eties, n
I
minimizes the output E may sell with any number of varieties nE:
more specically,
qE(nE j nI 6= n

I
) >
nE
2nI
for nE = 1; :::; 2nI   1 (7)
qE(nE j nI 6= n

I
) =
nE
2nI
= 1 for nE = 2nI : (8)
In fact, for any vector nI 6= n

I
, lI;1 >
1
2nI
or lI;nI < 1  
1
2nI
or lI;i+1   lI;i >
1
nI
(some i = 1; :::; nI   1): as a consequence, qE(nE = 1 j nI 6= n

I
) > 1
2nI
.
It is similarly qE(nE j nI 6= n

I
) > nE
2nI
for any nE  2nI   1. By way of
contradiction, denote by nE the minimum nE 2 f2; :::; 2nI   1g such that
qE(nE j nI 6= n

I
)  nE
2nI
: i.e., qE(n

E j nI 6= n

I
) 
n
E
2nI
while qE(nE j nI 6=
n

I
) > nE
2nI
(any nE < n

E). Hence qE(n

E j nI 6= n

I
)  qE(n

E   1 j nI 6= n

I
) <
1
2nI
. At the same time, since qE(nE j nI 6= n

I
) = nE
2nI
for nE = 2nI , there
exists nE 2 fn

E +1; :::; 2nI   1g such that qE(n

E +1 j nI 6= n

I
) 
n
E
+1
2nI
and
qE(n

E j nI 6= n

I
) 
n
E
2nI
. Hence, the variety introduced when moving from
nE to n

E + 1 varieties will raise Es output by no less that
1
2nI
, revealing
that the variety introduced when moving from nE   1 to n

E varieties was
inappropriately located.
It follows that a specied number of varieties nI can prevent entry only
if E(nE j n

I
) < 0, i.e., only if p
2nI
  F < 0. In fact, if p
2nI
  F  0 so that
E(nE j n

I
)  0, then E(nE j nI 6= n

I
) > 0 because of (7).
3.1 Solving the game for any F<p
We denote by n
I
the n
I
-location vector with a number of varieties, nI , equal
to the integer such that
p
2nI
< F 
p
2(nI   1)
. (9)
Note, rst of all, that E(nE j n

I
) = nE

p
2n
I
  F

< 0 for nE = 1; :::; 2nI :
thus E does not enter and henceI(n

I
) = p nIF . To check thatI(n

I
)  0,
note that, for any nI  2, inequality F 
p
2(n
I
 1)
leads to p   nIF  (nI  
2)F  0.7 Secondly, I(nI)  I(n

I
) for any nI 6=n

I
. Any nI with nI >nI
would reduce Is prots by increasing costs. Any nI 6=n

I
with nI =nI is either
e¤ective in preventing entry - hence leading to I(nI) = p nIF , just as n

I
-
or else invites entry, in this case obviously leading to lower prots (1 )p 
nIF ( denoting the market share captured by rm E). Any nI with nI <nI
would denitely invite entry since then E(nE j nI)  nE

p
2(n
I
 1)
  F

 0,
due to (6), (7), and (9). This in turn results in lower (or at least not higher)
prots for I. The last point is immediately proven for n
I
-location vectors:
taking into account (9) and (6), rm E will introduce nE = 2nI varieties,
thereby completely displacing rm I. Turn next to vectors of locations nI 6=
n

I
with nI <nI and such that E nds it most protable not to completely
displace I. Again, I(nI)  p   nIF . To see this, suppose rst that Es
best response is some nE with nE < nI . Denoting Es resulting output by ,
this means that p  nEF 
p
2
  nIF (the right-hand side being Es prots
with nE = nI). Then I(nI) = (1  )p  nIF  p  nIF : this follows from
p  nEF +
p
2
  nIF and the fact that F 
p
2(n
I
 nE)
due to (9). Suppose
next that nI = 1 or that E(nE = nI j nI) > E(nE < nI j nI). Then,
I(nI) 
p
2
  nIF ,
8 where p
2
  nIF  p  nIF since F 
p
2(n
I
 nI)
, again as a
consequence of (9).
By now, we have reached the following result.
Proposition 1 At any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, rm I o¤ers
nI varieties and I = p nIF ; rm E does not enter on the equilibrium path.
In one such equilibrium rm I chooses precisely the n
I
-location vector.
7If nI = 1, rm Is prot is p  F  0 because of (1).
8If Es best response is some nE such that nE > nI , then I(nI) <
p
2
  nIF since Es
market share will be higher than 1=2.
It is checked from (9) that nI tends to increase as F decreases. Firm I
will o¤er one variety if F 2 (p
2
; p]: this is the case of "blockaded entry", in
which rm I behaves like a pure monopolist. Strategic product proliferation
obtains when F  p
2
: rm I o¤ers two varieties if F 2 (p
4
; p
2
], three varieties
if F 2 (p
6
; p
4
], four varieties if F 2 (p
8
; p
6
]; and so on and so forth.
Finally, by reviewing the argument in this section, one can easily check
that Proposition 1 would hold even if rm E were allowed to produce just
one variety.
4 Concluding remarks
Our extension of Cabrals model sheds further light on the relationship be-
tween product proliferation and the degree of scale economies. In this connec-
tion it is worth to reformulate the results in a slightly di¤erent way. One way
of measuring the degree of scale economies is in terms of the rm minimum
e¢cient size: the degree of scale economies is the greater as the minimum
e¢cient size is the greater. As in Cabral (2000, p. 244), let us dene the
minimum e¢cient size, call it bq, as the level of output to be crossed in order
for average cost AC(q) = F
q
to fall below some critical level: clearly, the de-
gree of scale economies is increasing in F . Next, take this critical level to be
equal to the exogenously given price: then bq = F
p
. We have seen that, faced
with an n
I
-location vector, rm Es output with one variety is 1
2nI
. The
strategy of entry deterrence amounts to populating the output space with
su¢ciently many (and properly located) varieties so as to reduce below the
minimum e¢cient output what the potential entrant may sell with a single
variety; namely, nI is the minimum nI such that
1
2nI
< bq = F
p
. Therefore,
product proliferation will be the higher as the degree of scale economies is
the lower.
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